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COMMENTS
THE PHILADELPHIA PLAN AND STRICT
RACIAL QUOTAS ON FEDERAL CONTRACTS
J.

INTRODUCTION

In 1967, after an exhaustive review of the national employment
situation in specific cities, the Department of Labor concluded
that nonwhite workers were almost wholly excluded from membership
in the industrial and craft unions which serve the building industry
in the city of Philadelphia. 1 Such exclusion was found to be tantamount to unemployment in that industry, much of which is located
in the economically depressed areas where the nonwhite worker must
live. The percentage of nonwhites belonging to these construction
and craft unions corresponded almost exactly to the number of nonwhite workers employed under the lucrative Federal construction
contracts, an incredible one percent! 2
The Labor Department, in an attempt to combat this blatant
discrimination by contractors and unions, issued the Philadelphia
Plan in 1967, requiring government contractors to take affirmative
action to hire minority workers. That plan, having been found
illegal by the Comptroller General of the United States, was dropped,
and a revised Philadelphia Plan was issued in 1969.8 Because the
Department found virtual exclusion in six of the high paying crafts,
the Plan was designed to apply (initially at least) to those six trades.
It was later announced, however, that the Plan would be extended
to other trades in the Philadelphia area, and to other areas of the
country, should it prove to be a success in Philadelphia. 4 This brief,
that such a Plan will be extended nationwide and thereby reach and
affect innumerable industries and unions, has stimulated an involved
controversy which has surrounded the Plan since its inception and
has led the Department of Labor, the Attorney General, the Comptroller General, the AFL-CIO, and even the Congress of the United
States to do battle on the issue of the Philadelphia Plan.
1 The Labor Department's study of the construction industry in the Philadelphia
area was promulgated in the Department of Labor Order of September 23, 1969, at 4
(unpublished order) [hereinafter cited as September 23 Order].
2 ld.
s Department of Labor Order of June 27, 1969 [hereinafter cited as June 27
Order].
4 See Department of Labor News Release, June 27, 1969, at 2. See also remarks
by Assistant Secretary of Labor Fletcher that the Plan may be extended to twenty
specified cities within the very near future. L.A. Times, Feb. 9, 1970, § 1, at 4, col. 4.
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This comment will analyze the Plan-what it says, and what it
will mean for the minority workers for whom it was created. Questions of legality, constitutionality, and effectiveness of the Plan will
be discussed. In addition, questions raised by a tougher and more
controversial plan, which, it is proposed, is necessary to end racial
discrimination on Federally-assisted contracts, will be considered.
II.

EMPLOYMENT REALITIES FOR THE NONWHITE WORKER

The economic facts of life for a minority or nonwhite worker
are very simple: he will have much less opportunity to join an all
important union than if his skin were white; if he does manage to
get a job despite his highly visible handicap, he will have to work
for a great deal less money than if his skin were white; if he is
hired, his chances of staying on that job for any length of time are
considerably less than if his skin were white. 5 Federal, state, and
local government units have tried to end this situation through a
variety of devices, including Presidential Executive Orders issued
by the past three Presidents,6 the 1964 Civil Rights Act which
devoted an entire title to employment practices and job discrimination,7 and state and local Fair Employment Practices Commissions. 8
Yet with all these devices, very little has changed for the nonwhite
worker; "the present minority participation in ... trades (is) far
below that which should have reasonably resulted from participation in the past without regard to race, color, and national origin
119

5 Since World War II the nonwhite's unemployment rate has been double that of
the white's. Even though the total number of unemployed has dropped, the 2-1 ratio
has remained constant. In addition, the median income of the nonwhite has never
been more than 60% of the white's income. See generally EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, REPORT No. 1 (1966) j REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968); Peter, Housing: From Crisis to
Disaster? LooK, Feb. 10, 1970, at 53; M. HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA, ch. 4:
If You're Black Stay Back (1962).
6 Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961); Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30
Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965); reaffirmed in, Exec. Order No. 11,375, 32 Fed. Reg. 14303
(1967), and adopted by President Nixon in Exec. Order No. 11,478, 34 Fed. Reg. 12985
(1969).
7 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1964).
8 See, e.g., CAL. LABoR CoDE §§ 1410-1432 (West Supp. 1970).
9 September 23 Order, supra note I, at 5. It was found that minority group membership in the six major trade unions was:
I. Iron workers-1.4%
2. Steamfitters-.65%
3. Sheetmetal workers-1%
4. Electricians-1.76%
5. Elevator Construction Workers-.54%
6. Plumbers & Pipefitters-.51%
Id. at 4-S.
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THE ORIGINS AND REQUIREMENTS OF THE
PHILADELPHIA PLAN

The original Philadelphia Plan, issued in 1967, was formulated
with the avowed purpose of ending the low level of minority employment on Federal projects in the city of Philadelphia. It was
intended to implement the anti-discrimination program set forth
in Executive Order 11246 which is directed at all government contractors. Section 202 ( 1) of the Order provides:
The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, color, religion, sex or national
origin. The cont·ractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Such action shall include but not be limited to the following:
employment upgrading, demotion or transfer; recruitment or recruitment advertising; layoff or termination; rates of pay or other forms
of compensation; and selection for training, including apprenticeship. 10

Unlike the Order, the Plan was designed to deal with the employment problems of a small number of trades in a restricted area.
It required contract bidders to commit themselves to specified
affirmative action programs for nonwhite workers. The Comptroller
General of the United States, viewing his office as auditor and
watchdog of government expenditures,11 declared this Plan to be
invalid, as violating competitive bidding principles.12 He based this
finding on the fact that bidders had no specific idea, under the Plan,
what numerical goals they were committing themselves to at the
bidding stage. 13 The Labor Department set out to remedy this defect
30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965).
"Our interest and authority in the matter exists by virtue of the duty imposed
upon our Office by the Congress to audit all expenditures of appropriated funds, which
necessarily involves the determination of the legality obligating the Government to
payment of such funds. Authority has been specifically conferred on this Office to
render decisions to the heads of departments and agencies of the Government, prior
to the incurring of any obligations with respect to the legality of any action contemplated by them involving expenditures of appropriated funds, and this authority
has been exercised continuously by our Office since its creation whenever any question
as to the legality of a proposed action has been raised, whether by submission by an
agency head, or by complaint of an interested party, or by information coming to our
attention in the .course of our other operations." Comptroller General's Opinion,
August 5, 1969, at 2 (unpublished opinion) [hereinafter cited as Comptroller General's
Opinion].
12 47 COMP. GEN. 666 (1968).
13 The only court to hear the merits of such a plan disagreed with the Comptroller
General on its legality. In Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College District, 19 Ohio
2d 35, 249 N.E.2d 907 (1969), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 554 (1970), the Ohio Supreme
Court held that a "Cleveland Plan," established by the State and Federal Governments, was constitutional, and a proper action under the 1964 Civil Rights Act. That
Plan required affirmative action programs in government contract bids, but did not
10
11
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while still attempting to use the "color blind" approach envisioned
in E.O. 11246. Two years later, in June of 1969, the revised Philadelphia Plan was announced.
The scope of the revised Plan is virtually the same as the 1967
Plan. It is applicable to the five counties in and around Philadelphia,14 applies only to contractors with Federal or Federally-assisted
construction contracts which exceed $500,000, and covers only six
specified crafts: Iron Workers, Steamfitters, Sheetmetal Workers,
Electricians, Elevator Construction Workers, and Plumbers and PipefittersY; The Plan requires a potential contractor either to agree in
his bid to rely on a multi-employer program supervised by the
Office of Federal Contract Compliance/6 or to submit an affirmative action program for recruiting minority employees 17 which is
satisfactory under the Plan. Such a program must "include specific
goals of minority manpower utilization within the ranges to be
established by the Department of Labor, in cooperation with the
Federal contracting and administering agencies in the Philadelphia
Area ....1118
The Labor Department, through its Office of Federal Contract
Compliance, held public hearings, where the following factors were
considered:
(1) The current extent of minority group participation in the
trade.
(2) The availability of minority group persons for employment in
such trade.
(3) The need for training programs in the area and/or the need to
assure demand for those in or from the existing training programs.
(4) The impact of the program upon the existing labor force.19

Based on these four factors, the Labor Department set employment
goals for minority workers in the six affected trades. These begin
at four to six percent for the employer's 1970 work force, and
increase to a high of 20 percent in each trade after four years. 20 The
include specific goals or ranges set by either the State or Federal Governments prior
to the bidding.
14 Bucks, Chester, Delaware, Montgomery, and Philadelphia counties. June 27
Order, supra note 3, at I.
111 September 23 Order, supra note I, at 4-5. See note 9 supra.
16 September 23 Order, supra note I, app. at 4.
1 7 These workers include "Negro, Oriental, American Indian, Spanish Surnamed
American. Spanish Surnamed American includes all persons of Mexican, Puerto Rican,
Cuban or Spanish origin or ancestry." September 23 Order, supra note I, app. at 5.
18 Id. This requirement of specific goals, developed in response to the Comptroller General's I968 ruling, note I2 supra, has been the focus of the controversy
surrounding the revised Plan. See notes 25-35 infra, and accompanying text.
19 September 23 Order, supra note I, at I2-I3.
2o Id. at I5.
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contractor's duty under the Plan is to make a good faith attempt to
meet his goal of minority employment by broadening his recruitment
base, but the Plan expressly prohibits him from discriminating
against any individual applicant or employee while doing so. 21 If the
contractor does not agree to make this good faith attempt, the
O.F.C.C. cannot accept his bid, even though it be the lowest submitted. It must turn instead to the lowest bidder who agrees to
broaden his recruitment base and meet the goals set forth.
In addition, the O.F.C.C. has the duty, once the contract has
actually commenced, to conduct periodic checks on the contractor
to determine if his program is being adhered to. The affirmative
action program is the equivalent of any other material condition
of a government contract. If the contractor breaches that condition,
the O.F.C.C. may cancel the contract and sue for damages resulting
from that cancellation.
Failure of a contractor to reach his goals is not, however, a
per se breach, for he may defend by showing that he has made a
"good faith effort" to reach them. 22 In order to find that a contractor
has made that legitimate good faith effort, the O.F.C.C. will look
to his efforts to broaden his recruitment through at least the following activities:
(a) Notifying the community organizations (registered with the
O.F.C.C. Area Coordinator) of opportunities for minority workers on the government contract.
(b) Maintaining a file of each minority worker referred to him,
specifying what action was taken with respect to each referred
worker.
(c) Notifying the O.F.C.C. Area Coordinator whenever he has information that the union referral process has impeded him in his
effort to meet his goal.
(d) Demonstrating that he participated in the Labor Department's
training programs which are designed to provide trained craftsmen in the specified trade. 23

Reliance upon the practices of a local labor union to secure the goals
clearly is not enough to qualify as a good faith attempt. 24
IV.

THE CoNTROVERSY SuRROUNDING THE PHILADELPHIA PLAN

The major and most complete attack on the Philadelphia Plan
was nuide by the Comptroller General, who once again found 'It to
21
22
23

24

Id. app. at 5.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 17-18.
June 27 Order, supra note 3, at 10..
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be invalid. This time, however, the invalidity related to the corrected
defect of which he had seemingly stimulated development. Because
of the specific goals in the program, he reasons, the contractor will
be irresistibly drawn to look to the race or national origin of individual applicants, and such race or national origin will prove to be
the decisive factor in deciding whether or not to hire an individuaP5
Such racial considerations, he argues, are directly outlawed by two
separate sections of the 1964 Civil Rights Act: Section 703(a)
dealing with individual discrimination because of race, and Section
703 (j) dealing with preferential treatment of individuals or groups
of individuals.26
If, for example, a contractor requires 20 plumbers and is committed to
a goal of employment of at least five from minority groups, every
nonminority applicant for employment in excess of 15 would, solely
by reason of his race or national origin, be prejudiced in his opportunity for employment, because the contractor is committed to make
every effort to employ five applicants from minority groups . . . the
essential question is whether the Plan would require the contractor
to select a black craftsman over an equally qualified white one. We see
no room for doubt that the contractor in [this] situation . . . would
believe he would be expected to employ the black applicant[s], at
least until he had reached his goal of five nonminority [sic] group
employees . . . .27

In an opinion issued after the Comptroller General's,28 Attorney
General Mitchell declared the Plan to be lawful. Though he agrees
25 Comptroller General's Opinion, supra note 11, at 7. An important countervailing consideration is the weight the craft unions would exert against such minority
"favoritism." See notes 36-44 infra, and accompanying text.
26 Comptroller General's Opinion, supra note 11, at 6. Section 703{a) makes it an
unlawful employment practice for an employer:
to fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin;
Section 703 (j) provides that:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any
employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management
committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any
individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which
may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer,
referred or classified for employment by any employment agency or labor
organization, admitted to membership or classified by any labor organization,
or admitted to, or employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison with the total number or percentage of persons of such
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section,
or other area, or in the available work force in any community, State, section,
or other area.
42 U.S.C. § 2000{e) (1964). See notes 50-57 infra, and accompanying text.
27 Comptroller General's Opinion, supra note 11, at 13.
28 Attorney General's Opinion of September 22, 1969 [hereinafter cited as
Attorney General's Opinion].
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with the Comptroller General that Section 703 (a) of the Civil Rights
Act requires each individual to be treated without regard to race, he
argues that the Plan itself explicitly forbids just the kind of racial
considerations at the hiring stage to which the Comptroller General
makes reference. 29 It concerns itself only with broadening the
recruitment base of government contractors and does not refer in
any way to dealing with individual applicants, except to outlaw racial
considerations at the non-recruitment or hiring stage.30 In commenting upon the Comptroller General's example of the twenty
plumbers, the Attorney General reaches a very different conclusion.
If the contractor has filled fifteen of these posts with nonminority
plumbers, says the Comptroller General, the next white applicant for
one of the five vacancies will inevitably be discriminated against by
reason of the fact that he is not a member of a minority group. Doubtless a part of the good faith effort ... would have been to avail himself
of manpower sources which might be expected to produce a representative number of minority applicants, so that the situation posed in
the Comptroller General's example would arise but infrequently. Yet,
quite clearly, if notwithstanding the good faith efforts of the employer
such a situation does arise, the qualified nonminority employee may be
hired. The fact that the minority employment goal was to this extent
not reached would not in itself be sufficient ground for concluding that
the contractor had not exerted good faith efforts to reach it. 31

The Comptroller General, in anticipation of the argument raised
by the Attorney General, has refuted it as one of "semantics."32 He
believes that a contractor covered under the Plan will find it impossible to avoid looking to the race of individual applicants in
fulfilling his commitment to hire minority workers. The contractor
will be encouraged to do so by the belief that, inevitably, bidders
who have met their goals will be looked upon more favorably on
29 "[The contractor may] not discriminate against qualified employees or applicants [because] the purpose of the Philadelphia Plan is to place squarely upon
the contractor the burden of broadening his recruitment base whether within or
without the existing union referral system . . . [and it is not] intended and shall not
be used to discriminate against any qualified applicant or employee." Id. at 5, 13, 14.
30 "Nothing in the Philadelphia Plan requires an employer to violate section
703 (a). The employer's obligation is to make every good faith effort to meet his goals.
A good faith effort does not include any action which would violate section 703(a)
or any other provision of Title VII . . . [t]o remove any doubt the Plan specifies
that the contractor's commitment shall not be used to discriminate against any
qualified applicant or employee." I d. at 10.
31 Id. at 13.
32 "Whether the provision of the Plan requiring a bidder to commit himself to
hire-or make every good faith effort to hire-at least the minimum number of
minority group employees specified in the ranges established for the designated
trades is, in fact, a 'quota' system . . . or is a 'goal' system, is in our view largely
a matter of semantics, and tends to divert attention from the end result of the Planthat contractors commit themselves to making race or national origin a factor for
consideration in obtaining their employees." Comptroller General's Opinion, supra note
11, at 7.
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huge multi-million dollar projects than those who have not. Because
the Plan will result in encouraging an employer to make race or
national origin a determinative factor in his decision to hire workers,
the Comptroller General argues, it crosses over into the restricted
bounds of quotas and individual discrimination as prohibited by
Sections 703(a) and 703(j).
In recent legislative action, Congress has implicitly adopted
the position of the Attorney General, and rejected that of the Comptroller General. In the closing weeks of 1969, an amendment which
would have accepted the Comptroller General's interpretation of the
Philadelphia Plan and upheld his decision not to pay for contracts
issued under it was introduced in the Senate.33 The debate over
the bill was long and vigorous, with the two sides basically
adopting the position of either the Attorney General or the Comptroller GeneraP 4 The Attorney General's position prevailed, and
the amendment was defeated. 35 In recognition of the Congress'
apparent desire to go forward with the Plan, the Comptroller General
has since dropped his previously announced plans to refuse to pay
out any money to contractors complying with its terms.

V.

THE NEED FOR RACIAL QUOTAS

Regardless of whether one supports the position of the Comptroller General that the Philadelphia Plan establishes quotas, or
agrees with the Attorney General that it does not, a more important
question must be faced: will the Philadelphia Plan work? Will it
end discrimination against nonwhites on government contracts? The
sa Amendment 33 to the Senate version of H.R. 15209 reads as follows:
In view of and in confirmation of the authority invested in the Comptroller
General of the United States by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921,
as amended, no part of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by
this or any other Act, shall be made available to finance, either directly or
through any Federal aid or grant, any contract or agreement which the
Comptroller General of the United States holds to be in contravention of
any Federal statute ....
115 CoNG. REc. § 17624 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 1969). Debate over the amendment
indicated that it was put in solely to endorse the position of the Comptroller General
vis-a-vis the Philadelphia Plan.
"Senator Byrd (Dem. W. Va.): Of course, the factual situation which brought
this issue to a head involved the so-called Philadelphia Plan." I d. at § 17634.
"Senator Percy (Rep. Ill.): There is only one smart way to resolve this [employment situation] and that is by establishing procedures which stimulate, prod,
and encourage both sides to agree together on sound, equitable hiring practices. This
is the Philadelphia Plan. This is not coercive, as some have sought to make it ... ."/d.
at § 17630.
34 /d. at § 17625-34.
35 Though it had once passed, the amendment was rejected by the House, then
deleted by the Senate. Final vote on the measure was 39 in favor (of deleting the
amendment) 1 29 opposed. /d. at .§ 17634.

1970]

COMMENTS

825

realities of the construction industry lead one to conclude that the
Plan will not work. A plan which does not lay out specific, strict
racial quotas will not work because racial attitudes have hardened
almost to the breaking point. In addition, rising problems of inflation and automation are combining to raise the level of unemployment and promise to result in less and less opportunity for the lower
or nonskilled tradesmen, of which nonwhites make up a disproportionate share.36
Moreover, the powerful craft unions wholly control the hiring
in the construction industry.37 To predict that the manpower goals
will indeed be utilized as quotas, and that employers will look to the
race of individuals so as to give preference to nonwhites is to discount the sheer force and power of the construction unions. 38 These
powerful unions are likely to bring substantial pressure to bear if the
contractor attempts to hire nonwhite, nonunion workers for high
paying construction jobs to the exclusion of white, union applicants.
This is an industry which has historically ignored all moves toward
nondiscrimination.39 Many varied attempts have been made nationally and locally to end job discrimination. Such attempts included actions under the National Labor Relations Act40 and the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the creation of State Fair Employment
Practices Commissions, 41 and various self-help mechanisms. 42 All
these attempts have failed. Still the nonwhite works for much less
36 See generally L.A. Times, Feb. 7, I970, § I, at 1, col. 1, where Labor Editor
Harry Bernstein discussed the most recent unemployment survey [as yet unpublished] issued in January by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
37 " [Contractors] . . . rely on the construction craft unions as their prime or
sole source of their labor . . . [and] referral by a union is a virtual necessity for
obtaining employment in union construction projects, which constitute the bulk of
commercial construction." Comptroller General's Opinion, supra note 11, at 3. In
Philadelphia, the Labor Department also found that nonunion membership was
tantamount to nonemployment on the government contracts. Such union activity in
referring only union members for jobs is clearly a violation of the National Labor
Relations Act, § 8(a}(3}, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a}(3} (1964), yet it is a violation not
easily proven. See generally Teamsters Local 357 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 673-74
(I96I).
38 The power of the unions is especially great in the construction industry. See
Department of Labor News Release, September 23, 1969 (Secretary Shultz).
39 See note 9 supra, and accompanying text.
40 See United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 4I6 F.2d 1126 (D.C. Cir.
1969), for a novel (and potentially revolutionary) approach to employee complaint coverage under the NLRA: holding racial discrimination to be a per se violation of § 8(a} (I} (29 U.S.C. § I58(a} (1) (I964}) of the Act. Unfortunately, such
an approach is highly unlikely to become widespread.
41 See Hill, Twenty Years of State Fair Employment .Practice Commissions: A
Critical Analysis with Recommendations, I4 BuFFALO L. REv. 22 (1965).
42 Such as the ever increasing economic boycotts and applications of political
and social pressures. Note, for example, the recent strikes in Pittsburgh and Chicago
which closed down numerous construction sites. NEWSWEEK, Oct. 6, 1969, at lOS, and
Sept. 8, I969,. a~ 34,
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money each year than his white counterpart, is out of work for much
longer periods of time and much more often,43 and is, on the whole,
excluded from membership in many vital unions. 44
The situation is strikingly parallel to that in public education.
For fifteen years, the courts relied on the school boards to desegregate with "all deliberate speed." 45 These courts have found, however,
after fifteen difficult and frustrating years, that only by ordering
immediate desegregation, with the school boards drafting and adhering to strict desegregation plans (and only under close and careful
judicial scrutiny) will the legality of desegregation become reality.
Allowing school boards to initiate "good faith" freedom of choice
plans simply achieves nothing for those who are being discriminated
against. 46 It is unrealistic for the Government to request desegregation or forbid segregation-such a well intended, sweeping action
simply does not work.
There is no reason to believe that persuasion, conciliation, and
requirements of good faith efforts will achieve any more in employment than they have in education/ 7 nor to believe that a law which
places the burden of going forth on the nonwhite worker/ 8 who is
being discriminated against, will work. The overlapping anti-discrimination statutes and orders have not accomplished any real
change because they proclaim a policy of color-blindness in a color
conscious society. The only approach, therefore, which will work
in employment is the one ordered in education: strict numerical
requirements and a time schedule for hiring nonwhite workers, i.e.,
racial quotas. 49
43

See generally EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITYS CoMMISSION, REPORT No.

1 (1966).
44 See note 5 supra, and accompanying text.
41! Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
4 6 "In my opinion there is no reason why such a wholesale

deprivation of constitutional rights [segregated schools] should be tolerated another minute. I fear that
this denial of constitutional rights is due in large part to the phrase 'with all
deliberate speed.' I would do away with that phrase completely.'' Alexander v.
Holmes City Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 1218, 1222 (1969) (Black, J.) (application to
vacate suspension of order denied).
"The time for mere 'deliberate speed' has run out. . . . The burden on a school
today is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and
promises realistically to work now." Green v. New Kent School Bd., 391 U.S. 430,
439 (1968).
47 See generally United States v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836,
888-91 (5th Cir. 1967).
4 8 The present procedure under the 1964 Civil Rights Act for suits brought
under it.
49 There may, however, be some basis for the view that local solutions, singularly
unsuccessful in the past, should be exhausted before having the Federal Government
step. in and. impose a tough program on a community. A fresh new local approach
is being attempted in Chicago, where a plan quite similar to the Philadelphia Plan
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CIVIL RIGHTS AcT, THE CONSTITUTION AND
STRICT RACIAL QUOTAS

If such a revolutionary program as a strict racial quota system
is to be initiated on Federal contracts, two different standards must
be met, restrictions in the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and limitations
set forth in the Constitution. The 1964 Civil Rights Act does appear
to prohibit such quotas. It is the thesis of this comment, however,
that the Constitution does more than permit racial quotas by the
Government. It requires them. Therefore, if the Act prohibits what
we shall see is a constitutional requirement, that prohibition would
itself fall as an unconstitutional restriction.

A. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
It is argued that an employment quota system based on race
would violate the Civil Rights Act in two separate ways: it is preferential treatment, outlawed by Section 703 (j), and it would result in
discrimination against whites as forbidden by Section 703 (a).

Section 703 (j) provides that
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require
any employer ... to grant preferential treatment to any individual or
to any group because of the race [or] color ... of such individual or
group ....5o

The Comptroller General asserts that Section 703 (j) must be read
as forbidding racial quotas, for that, he declares, was the clear
legislative intent behind the section. 51 The legislative history he
cites/2 however, does not support this conclusion. Rather the Senators were saying that the title itself gives no power to anyone to
require quotas. They were not saying that the title forbids anyone
from so requiring, or that the power to require such quotas cannot
derive from another source, such as a court or executive order
was developed by the City of Chicago, the black community, and local employers
and unions, and not by the Federal Government. See L.A. Times, Jan. 18, 1970, § F,
at 1, col. 1. The major difficulty with such a plan, as Senator Percy (himself an
advocate of local plans) noted, is that there simply are no tough enforcement measures to make sure that all parties abide by the plan. 115 CoNG. REC. § 17630
(daily ed. Dec. 22, 1970).
50 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-2(j) (1964); see note 26 supra.
51 Comptroller General's Opinion, supra note 11, at 8.
52 Senator Humphrey: "Contrary to the allegations of some opponents of this
title, there is nothing in it that will give any power to the Commission or to any court
to require hiring, firing, or promotion of employees in order to meet a racial 'quota'
or to achieve a certain racial balance." 110 CoNG. REC. 6549 (I 964).
Senators Clark and Case:
"There is no requirement in title VII that an employer maintain a racial balance
in his work force." Id. at 7213.
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based on the Constitution. 53 Section 703 (j) simply states that Congress did not see fit to require preferential treatment in Title VII;
it does not declare such preferential treatment to be forbidden or
unlawful.
There are two very distinct issues involved which the Comptroller General seems to merge, what the Act requires, limited by
Section 703 (j), and what the Act prohibits, in Section 703 (a). Section 703 (a) makes it an unlawful employment practice for an
employer
to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....54

Requiring an employer to follow a quota seems to encourage him
to fail or refuse to hire any individual (the white man not covered
by the quota) because of such individual's race. There can be
very little doubt that in order to meet his quota an employer
may well have to hire a black or brown man rather than a white
man even though their job "credentials" are not as impressive.
Section 703 (a) appears then to make such conduct unlawful. 55
Another construction of Section 703 (a) is available, however.
It seems not unreasonable to read "fail or refuse to hire ... or otherwise to discriminate against ... " as making it unlawful to fail or
refuse to hire an individual only if the employer's purpose is to
discriminate against him by this failure or refusal. In the case of
the white worker who is turned away from the job, he is not discriminated against. He is refused a job, not because the employer feels
any ill will toward him, or harbors any racial bigotry, but only
because the employer (or the Federal Government) wishes to hire
more nonwhite workers so as to equalize the available opportunities
in employment. This construction is more credible when one looks
to the rationale behind the entire 1964 Civil Rights Act, nonwhites
53 The Comptroller General himself accepted the independent authority of the
President to issue Exec. Order 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965), with or without
the Civil Rights Act as additional authority. Comptroller General's Opinion, supra
note 11, at 2.
54 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-2(a) (1964).
55 This is how Senators Clark and Case apparently felt. " ... (A)ny deliberate
attempt to maintain a racial balance, whatever such a balance may be, would involve
a violation of title VII because maintaining such a balance would require an employer to hire or to refuse to hire on the basis of race. It must be emphasized that
discrimination is prohibited as to any individual." 110 CoNG. REc. 7213 (1964).
The Attorney General agrees with this view of § 703 (a). See text accompanying
note 29 supra.
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were being treated unequally at all levels of society because of their
race, and something was needed to end such inequality. 116
Two constructions of Section 703 (a), therefore, are available.
To use the latter and allow quotas seems to contradict much of the
sentiment expressed by the lawmakers who enacted Section 703 (a).
To adopt the former, however, might immediately draw the section
into conflict with a constitutional requirement for racial quotas on
Federal contracts. 57
B. Are Quotas Permissible under the Constitution?
The major constitutional objection to racial quotas on Federal
contracts is the claim that such quotas would violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which has been interpreted
to require the same racial equality of the Federal Government as
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does of
the states. 58 It is argued that, because the employment quotas cover
only nonwhites, whites will be treated unequally. However, even
though the white worker may be treated unequally, it does not follow
that his constitutional rights have somehow been infringed, as the

56 See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 1963; EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITYS COMMISSION, REPORT No. 1 (1966).
57 See notes 69-79 infra, and accompanying text. A very similar problem arises
in the interpretation of § 202 (1) of Executive Order 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319
(1965), for it provides that:
The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for
employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The
contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Such action shall
include but not be limited to the following: employment upgrading, demotion or transfer; recruitment or recruitment advertising; layoff or termination; rates of pay or other forms of compensation; and selection for
training, including apprenticeship.
E.O. 11,246 appears to go even one step beyond § 703 (a), for it requires that
employees be treated "without regard to their race," and not just that the employer
may not discriminate against any individual. Thus, a quota which may force employers
to look to the race of individuals would appear to be causing them to treat applicants with regard to their race. While E.O. 11,246 must face the same conflict with
a constitutional requirement for a quota as § 703 (a), a real difference exists between
them. Although a court could order quotas implemented on Federal contracts, with
or without a modification of E.O. 11,246, it is unlikely that any large scale racial
quota would ever be imposed on contractors without the President's authorization,
and the President has the power to amend, modify, or even revoke prior executive
orders.
58 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,500 (1954). See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618, 642 (1968); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964); Fernandez v.
Meier, 408 F.2d 974, 976 (9th Cir. 1969); Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 786 (5th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969).
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Comptroller General apparently feels. 59 The purpose of having an
equal protection test is to determine if an action by the government
unconstiutionally deprives any individual of his rights, or, stated
another way, whether the individual has the "right" which he claims.
If there is an overriding purpose for the Government's action, and
there is no less onerous alternative for achieving that purpose, no
rights are denied, even though the individual is treated unequally. 60
The purpose of the Federal Government in requiring racial
quotas on its contracts would be to end the racial discrimination
which nonwhites have been systematically and historically subjected
59 " ••• [W]e believe there is a material difference between the situation in those
cases, where enforcement of the rights of the minority individuals to vote or to have
unsegregated education or housing facilities does not deprive any member of a
majority group of his rights, and the situation in the employment field, where the
hiring of a minority worker, as one of a group whose number is limited by the employer's needs, in preference to one of the majority group precludes the employment of the
latter." Comptroller General's Opinion, supra note 11, at 14 (emphasis added).
60 Normally an equal protection issue such as this would be resolved by determining whether the purpose of the governmental action is a rational, legitimate
one, and whether the means employed to achieve that end are reasonably connected
to it. "Although the equal protection clause is, of course, concerned with classifications
which result in disparity of treatment, not all classifications resulting in disparity are
unconstitutional. If classification is reasonably related to the purpose of the governmental activity involved and is rationally carried out, the fact that persons are
thereby treated differently does not necessarily offend." Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F.
Supp. 401, 511 (D.D.C. 1967). See also Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Norvell
v. Dlinois, 373 U.S. 420 (1963); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959);
Horowitz, Unseparate but Unequal--The Emerging Fourteenth Amendment Issue in
Public School Education, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1147 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
Horowitz]; Tussman and ten Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF.
L. REv. 341 (1949).
In some areas, however, because of the important nature of the interests involved,
something more than this normal test is required to resolve the equal protection
claims. These other areas include actions which: deprive a citizen of his voting
franchise, Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965), where servicemen were prohibited
from voting in state elections; limit the indigent's ability to defend himself at the
appellate level of the criminal process, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963),
wllere the appellate court had the right to determine if sufficient reason existed for
providing the indigent defendant with counsel for appeal, and Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956), where trial transcripts were not provided to indigent defendants
seeking appeal; or classify citizens as to race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967),
where the state banned interracial marriages, and McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184 (1964), where the state forbad racially mixed couples from living together out
of wedlock.
In these areas, a much tougher test is utilized to resolve the questions raised.
Here the courts require more than the "rational basis and means" determination, for
in all the cases cited above there was, at least arguably, some rational basis for the
action taken by the state. The action must be validated by an overriding statutory
purpose and the government must sustain a very heavy burden of justification to
show that there are no less onerous alternatives for achieving that purpose. See
generally Horowitz, supra, at 1162-66. See also Loving v. Virginia, supra; Rinaldi
v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966); McLaughlin v. Florida, supra; McGowan v. Maryland, supra.
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to. 61 Quotas would provide nonwhites with more than the present one
percent of construction contract jobs they now have in many cities,
including Philadelphia, and would also begin to solve many of the
unemployment (and underemployment) problems which nonwhites
must face when turned away from construction employment. In addition, such quotas would begin to eliminate some of the less tangible
but equally severe effects of racial discrimination in employment:
hate, fear, docility, and "an inhibition to act for change." 62
The critics of racial quotas in employment contend, however,
that the purpose behind the quotas cannot be overriding or essential
because of the effects such quotas will have on white workers: they
will not be able to get particular jobs which but for the quotas they
would get, and they may find themselves without jobs. 63 Yet even
given this possibility, the purpose of ending racial discrimination
so outweighs any harm done to white workers as to still be overriding
and vital. The only alternative to such quotas and potential harm
to white workers is to retain the same methods of anti-discrimination
enforcement as have been used in the past, i.e., to perpetuate the
virtual exclusion of nonwhite workers from the construction industry.
Moreover, although potential harm to white workers is present in
the form of unemployment, this is no greater harm than if nonwhites had never been discriminated against, for then all workers
would presumably have been treated equally-nonwhites would not
have been as greatly unemployed or underemployed as they are.
White workers, through a system of manpower supply and demand,
would have had less employment than they do now. 64 For the Government then to begin to require quotas on its contracts is simply
to strip away the results of past racial inequalities; white workers
would be affected as if there had been no racial discrimination
against nonwhites in the past. Hence, even with potential harm to
white workers, the overriding purpose for the quotas remains. Unless
employment opportunities can somehow be equalized, one must drop
61

See notes 1-9 supra, and accompanying text.

United Packinghouse Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d 1126, 1136-37 (D.C. Cir.
1969). See note 72 infra.
63 See generally L.A. Times, Feb. 7, 1970, § 1, at 1, col. 1. The Labor Department
argues that no whites will be put out of work as a result of its employment goals,
because the goals will merely take up the attrition and growth "slacks" in the construction industry. September 23 Order, supra note 1, at 9. There is, however, evidence
to the contrary, especially in light of the slump the construction industry is presently
in. See Peter, Housing: From Crisis to Disaster? LooK, Feb. 10, 1970, at 53.
64 This is, of course, assuming that the infusion of nonwhite workers into the
construction industry would not have resulted in increased growth in the industry
(due to the broader spending power which would have resulted for nonwhites) and
therefore more jobs for all construction workers. While no statistical evidence is
available on this point, one can safely assume that such infusion of nonwhites would
have indeed expanded economic growth at least to some extent.
62
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any hopes of ever equalizing any other social, economic, or political
·
opportunities in our nation. 65
Given an overriding statutory purpose for racial quotas, there
still remains the question of whether any less onerous alternative
exists to achieve that purpose. Unfortunately, no less onerous alternative does exist. 60 The Civil Rights Act, Executive Orders, and State
F.E.P.C.s have had no material success. The nonwhite worker is
still in the same comparative situation he was in twenty years ago,
long before any of these anti-discrimination efforts were made.67
A goals system, such as the Philadelphia Plan, will not work because
it does not have the power to shatter the bitter racial attitudes
which pervade the construction industry, nor can it end the stranglehold the union appears to have on construction contractors. 68
Therefore, since the only means for achieving an end to racial
discrimination is strict racial quotas initiated by the Federal Government, such action is not prohibited by the Constitution.
C. Are Quotas Required by the Constitution?

Racial quotas are a factual necessity to combat the grossly
unfair and unequal employment conditions which exist on Federal
construction contracts. They are also a constitutional necessity. This
is true because the Federal Government is required to eradicate
conditions of present and past discrimination in which it has been
involved through past action, and because it cannot now take part
in racial discrimination. 69 Past policies of contract issuance have
contributed to, and present "color blind" policies support, racial
discrimination. Thus, an affirmative duty must be imposed on
the Government to end and undo the effects of this discrimination
through the only effective means available, racial quotas. 70
See note 72 infra.
oo Some have argued that there is another alternative to racial quotas, quotas for
all poor people. The appeal of such a program primarily rests with the fact that
it would benefit whites as well as nonwhites. The problem, however, is that poor
whites do not need quotas to get jobs-they are not discriminated against because of
their race, they are merely unskilled. A training program would work for them, even
though such programs have proved. to be a failure for nonwhites.
67 See notes 1-9 supra, and accompanying text.
68 See notes 37-49 supra, and accompanying text.
69 The same questions are involved with actions by the Federal Government as
they are with actions by the states. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
70 The Comptroller General felt otherwise about the requirement for quotas:
"Even if the present composition of an employer's work force or the membership of a
union is the result of past discrimination, there is no requirement imposed by the
Constitution, by a mandate of the Supreme Court, or by the Civil Rights Act for
an employer or a union to affirmatively desegregate its personnel or membership."
Comptroller General's Opinion, supra note 11, at 13.
65
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The Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education71 ordered
public schools to desegregate because of the disastrous effects segregation and discrimination were having on the black youths, and also
because the states themselves were clearly and actively involved in
the segregation and discrimination. With employment racial discrimination on Federal contracts, the situation is the same. 72 The
government involvement here is just as decisive as the State Action
was in Brown. Here, though, the government is involved through its
money, which supported those who discriminated against nonwhite
workers. Such financial aid is enough to constitute prohibited State
Action by the Federal Government. 73
These Federal dollars-part of which are Black, Puerto Rican, Mexican-American, and others-enter local economy primarily through
Federal contracts. Once these dollars pass the "Gateway" of contracting procedure-the Federal Government has no further control over
them. Through the "multiplier" effect experienced by imported money
in the regional economy and the existence of institutionalized segregation-the Federal Government can be pictured as contributing to the
denial of the right to succeed for substantial groups of pe<Jple. No
amount of money spent by whatever level of Government to correct
this situation can be justified after the fact.7 4

Such active financial support is not, however, the only form of the
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
"The conclusion that racial discrimination may impede its victims in
asserting their rights seems inescapable. This docility stems from a number of factors
-fear, ignorance of rights, and a feeling of low self-esteem engendered by repeated
second class treatment because of race or national origin. Discrimination in employment is no different in this respect than discrimination in other spheres. In its
historic decision in Brown v. Board of Education ... the Supreme Court stated: ' ...
To separate [Negroes] from other[s] of similar age and qualifications solely because
of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone .... ' ... Dr.
Kenneth Clark ... has shown discrimination induced self-hatred in Negro inhabitants
of slums, due in good part to discrimination in employment, creates a feeling of
inferiority and lack of motivation to assert themselves to change their condition. In
all this, discrimination in employment thus establishes, or reinforces the effect of
discrimination in other areas-an inhibition to act for change." United Packinghouse
Workers v. NLRB, 416 F.2d II26, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
These intangible effects of job discrimination such as fear, feelings of inferiority,
and docility, strongly resemble those engendered by discrimination in the area of
education. Yet the tangible effects of employment discrimination point to even
harsher consequences for the nonwhite. He will earn considerably less money than
the white, and he must live in a slum or ghetto environment where his children are
forced to attend grossly inferior schools and face emotionally damaging conditions of
crime and violence daily. In this way the employment discrimination affects not only
the worker himself, but another entire generation as well.
73 For other formulations of the government involvement-State Action standards, see Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230
(1957).
74 Remarks by Assistant Labor Secretary Fletcher, June 23, 1969 in Philadelphia,
at 2 [on file with the UCLA Law Review].
71
72
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Federal Government's involvement with past racial discrimination
on its projects. Though cognizant of the discrimination which was
(and is) taking place against nonwhite workers, 75 the Federal Government took no effective actions to end the discrimination, such as
cancellation of contracts. Such inaction has resulted in a continuation
of the discrimination, for the contractors knew they would not be
punished for their unlawful deeds. Such silent encouragement or
stimulation, albeit through omission rather than commission, bears
the same mark of prohibited State Action as was found in Burton
v. Wilmington Parkington Authority.76 The essential factor in both
cases is the official posture of the government, which, by doing
nothing affirmative, profits (through financial rewards or satisfaction
of contracts) from the private racial discrimination.
Even if one were to argue that the Federal Government's past
involvement with discrimination is somehow not the equivalent of
the State Action in Burton or Brown, 77 the Government would still,
of course, be precluded from making contracts which would now
result in racial discrimination against nonwhite workers. Factually,
this means that the Government may not rely on the present "color
blind" hiring system. Such a hiring system is theoretically neutral.
It requires an employer to hire the most qualified and experienced
worker he can find, regardless of that individual's race-he is simply
looking for the worker with the most ability. The practice, however,
perpetuates the effects of past discrimination. In the employment
area, past instances of racial discrimination have stripped the nonwhite of any sort of comparative ability or work skills by denying
him decent schooling, the chance to belong to a union and receive
on-the-job apprenticeship training, and by keeping him out of work
for such long periods as to eliminate any potential skills he might
have. To rely on the "color blind" ability test is to acknowledge,
accept, and perpetuate acts of past discrimination against the minority worker. Thus, to compare abilities or experience will result in
the nonwhite being turned away on the basis of past racial considerations. Factually such a policy "disregarding" past discrimination does not make any sense.
We can't tomorrow say: "All right, we're not going to have any more
discrimination. We're going to treat all Americans as if they are
Americans, and therefore everything will be all right." This is non-

See September 23 Order, supra note 1, at 5.
365 u.s. 715 (1961).
Much the same argument is made in the school desegregation cases where the
distinction between de facto and de jure segregation is drawn. See Hobson v. Hansen,
269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), involving the Washington, D.C. schools; Crawford v.
Board of Education of Los Angeles, Civil No. 822,854 (L.A. Super. Ct., Feb. 11,
1970) involving Los Angeles City schools.
711
76
77
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sense. During the transition from injustice to justice, it is my personal
opinion that we cannot pretend that there are no consequences of
past injustices. We've got to face those co.nsequences and do whatever
is necessary to rectify them .... (These problems) have to be resolved
by color-consciousness until we get to that ideal state where we need
no longer worry about a person's color.7B

Legally, it makes just as little sense.
Such past conduct may illuminate the purpose and effect of present
policies and activities and show that policies which appear neutral are
in fact designed to presently discriminate.79

This "ability hiring system" in employment is no less discriminatory than is the ability-tracking schemes in education for nonwhite youngsters.
The court does not, however, rest its decision on a finding of
intended racial discrimination. Apart . from such intentional aspects,
the effects of the track system must be held to be a violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights. As the evidence in this case makes painfully
clear, ability grouping as presently practiced ... is a denial of equal
educational opportunity to the poor and a majority of the Negroes attending school in the nation's capital ....so

VII.

CoNCLUSION

The unequal employment problems facing the United States are
truly overwhelming both in scope and in intensity. The Labor Department's Philadelphia Plan is a lawful, yet ineffective, attempt to
alter that situation on Federal contracts. Only a strict racial quota
system will alleviate these problems as well as satisfy the constitutional requirement for affirmative government action in this area.
Section 703 (a) seemingly may be construed so as to forbid such
quotas. If so, it must fall as an unlawful impingement on a constitu78

Doctor Kenneth Clark, quoted in N. HENTOFF, THE NEw

EQUALITY

at 98

(1964).

79 Dobbins v. Local 212, 292 F. Supp. 413, 443 (S.D. Ohio, 1968). See also
Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516 (E.D. Va. 1968), where the
court was forced to look to past practices in the industry as well as by the employer
to determine if present actions of requiring minority employees to start at the
bottom of a departmental seniority list when transferring from a "lower" department
are discriminatory against these workers. The court found that they were, because
these workers had been forced to remain for long periods of time in the "lower"
departments due to past racial discrimination. To allow this kind of seniority system
would simply be to ratify and validate past discrimination, much as if the workers
were forbidden now to transfer because they possessed no prior skill or experience
in the new departmental jobs.
so Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 443 (D.D.C. 1967). Judge Wright went
on to explain how the background of the black children led to their poor showings
on ability tests. I d. at 514. ·
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tional duty. However, it can be interpreted as permitting racial
quotas.
Having asked ourselves these legal and constitutional question?,
one further question remains to be answered: should the Federal
Government adopt as a major policy a racial quota scheme which
will continue to stress the race problems and differences which exist
in our country? In a recent article, Professor John Kaplan asserts
that to initiate racial quotas, whatever the valid purpose, would be
a mistake, for such quotas can only exacerbate an already frighteningly tense racial situation. 81 While not disputing at all that quotas
may exacerbate our racial situation, one must reject such an argument as the same argument which has been used throughout the past
half century to forestall attempts, including the integration of
schools, to improve the lot of impoverished, oppressed people. It says,
. "Look, we just cannot do that right now because people will get angry
and violent; so let's just sit on it awhile." Such an argument, if ever
valid, can certainly not be accepted today, for other people, those
who are being discriminated against, are getting angry and violent,
and for good reason. One must realize that nothing done by the
Government will, in the short run, prevent violence and anger fr'om
some segment of society. The real hope is that, even if racial quotas
do produce such violence and anger now, in the long run they will
produce equality and justice which will result in domestic tranquillity.
As the Supreme Court has realized, 82 there are some national goals
which cannot be put off any longer-decent educational opportunities
is one of these goals, equal employment opportunities must be
another.
PAUL MARCUS

81 Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The
Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363 (1966).
82 Holmes v. Alexander Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969).

